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By 1909, when Dewey celebrated his fi ft ieth birthday, he had long since augmented 
the pragmatic ideas of Charles Peirce and William James and forged from them a 
powerful method of philosophical, social, and educational critique and reconstruc-
tion. James had labeled him a philosophical hero and his ideas were inspiring lead-
ing philosophers and progressive era reformers. Following his death in 1952, and 
by his centennial year 1959, during the depths of the Cold War and the ascendency 
of Anglo-American analytical philosophy, Dewey was at best a marginal fi gure in 
both social criticism and philosophy. In recent years, however, his star has again 
risen. Dewey’s pragmatism has attracted abundant scholarly attention, inspired a 
new wave of original pragmatist thinkers such as Richard Rorty, Cornel West, and 
Richard Shusterman, and in Dewey’s sesquicentennial year is again an important 
resource in addressing contemporary issues.  
Cosmopolitanism in 2009 is arguably the philosophical and social counter-
part of the progressivism of 1909. In this paper, I argue that Dewey’s pragmatism 
has (at least) two valuable lessons for the theory and practice of cosmopolitanism. 
Aft er situating Dewey in the current discussion of cosmopolitanism and locating 
this cosmopolitan strain in his own philosophy, I show the value of his theory of in-
quiry as a meta-theory for cosmopolitan studies and of his theory of agency through 
art for building cosmopolitan publics for deliberation and action. 
Pragmatism and Cosmopolitanism 
I start with a few words about pragmatism and cosmopolitanism. Pragmatism, in 
its primary philosophical sense, is a set of theories about truth, meaning, experi-
ence, and method. Familiar examples include James’s pragmatic theory of truth as 
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a kind of good we can use to form productive expectations, and Peirce’s theory of 
meaning as consisting in empirical observations hypothetically conducted under 
specifi able conditions. Dewey’s philosophy is built upon these earlier pragmatic 
notions, though it contains other elements, including some not strictly implied by 
pragmatism in this primary sense.
Contemporary cosmopolitanism also is a set of theories, fi rst, about justice, 
rights and obligations, and institutions that can sustain them, and second, about 
culture and identity. Cosmopolitan theories of the fi rst sort take the social unit to 
which a theory of justice applies to be global humanity. It implies global obliga-
tions, and thus seeks trans-national institutions capable of fulfi lling them. Cosmo-
politan theories of the second sort claim that human agency and identity do not 
depend upon enclosed membership within, and identifi cation with, determinate 
social groups; even (or only) individuals making multiple attachments and form-
ing hybrid identities can thrive. Th ey hold, moreover, that social groups are not in 
themselves determinate; they are always in fl ux and depend on contact with other 
groups for their own vitality.1
Armed with these defi nitions we can speak about both “pragmatic cosmopoli-
tanism” and “cosmopolitan pragmatism,” but these ideas are not interchangeable. 
Th e fi rst is a kind of cosmopolitanism, a theory of justice or culture (etc.) infused 
with pragmatic insights regarding truth, meaning, experience, and method. Th e 
latter is a kind of pragmatism, a theory of truth, meaning or method infused with 
cosmopolitan insights regarding justice culture, or identity. Dewey’s own philoso-
phy was itself cosmopolitan, but I will not primarily be concerned about whether 
Dewey’s cosmopolitanism grew from his pragmatism, or whether his distinctly 
cosmopolitan notions have much to contribute to contemporary cosmopolitanism, 
though both are intriguing questions. My aim here is rather to understand the rel-
evance of Dewey’s pragmatism for contemporary cosmopolitanism.
The Contemporary Discussion of Cosmopolitanism 
Let me turn to the current state of discussion. Fine and Cohen2 have identifi ed four 
cosmopolitan moments: the era of Roman imperial domination, the Enlightenment’s 
spread of universal moral ideas, the post-World War II response to totalitarianism, 
and the current era of globalization with its migrations, terrorism, and eco-disasters. 
Each of these, they argue, has had a primary philosophical voice: the Stoics, Kant, 
Hannah Arendt, and Martha Nussbaum. 
Th is oft -cited account has recently been challenged. Giri argues that it excludes 
events in the non-Western world and non-Western philosophical responses.3 Closer 
to home, Keck claims the American revolutionary period to be a distinct cosmopoli-
tan moment, and that American political and intellectual history has been marked 
by such moments, each with leading thinkers (Madison, Emerson, Lincoln, Whit-
man, etc.).4 Fischer off ers the colonial imperialism eventuating in World War I as 
another cosmopolitan moment, which she labels the “pragmatist cosmopolitan mo-
ment” because American pragmatism has been a source of its primary philosophical 
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critique.5 In her account of that cosmopolitan moment, Fischer turns from Dewey 
and other leading pragmatists to concentrate on Bourne, Du Bois, and Addams. 
Fischer features these pragmatists because cosmopolitanism needs blueprints for 
action and they grounded cosmopolitan views in activist practice. 
Dewey’s Cosmopolitanism 
No account of that pragmatist cosmopolitan moment, however, can avoid Dewey. 
A few words about Dewey’s own cosmopolitanism will point to ideas I will rely on 
in drawing lessons from his pragmatic philosophy. 
While Dewey does not oft en use the terms cosmopolitan and cosmopolitan-
ism, the notions play an essential role in his mature viewpoint. He fi rst uses them 
in his early work on Leibniz, praising Leibniz for his cosmopolitan standpoint in 
both philosophy and diplomacy and showing how these shaped one another.6 Th ey 
next appear in the fi rst edition of the Ethics, where Dewey considers with approval 
the origins of ethical universalism and moral individualism in the cosmopolitan-
ism of the Greek Stoics and the development of these ideals in Christianity and 
Enlightenment philosophy culminating in Kant.7
Th ese brief references are updated in Th e German Philosophy and in Democ-
racy and Education, both written in the period of WWI. His story, similar in both 
works, runs as follows: early cosmopolitans imagined a universal moral community 
lying beyond actually existing political communities with their biases and corrup-
tion; cosmopolis was a moral ideal beyond concrete institutions. Th e Enlighten-
ment then moved towards a “wider and freer society—towards cosmopolitanism. . . 
. [as] membership in humanity, as distinct from a state . . . [in which] man’s capaci-
ties (would) be liberated. . . . Th e emancipated individual was to become the organ 
and agent of a comprehensive and progressive society.”8 Further Fichte connected 
cosmopolitan ideals and actual institutions by conceiving the German state, with 
its far-reaching philosophical and literary culture, as the representative of cosmo-
politan order and the instrument for its promotion. But the German philosophy 
reduced moral individuality to subservience to the universal state, while German 
state practice coercively pressed individuals into national industrial and military 
projects aimed at domination, not cosmopolitan cooperation.9
Th e question arising for Dewey is whether any factors in the nation-state order 
can be used to transcend it to create a wider and freer, more cosmopolitan world 
order. He addressed that question from the educational side in Democracy and Edu-
cation 10 and from a social and political standpoint in Th e Public and its Problems.
Dewey begins the latter work by distinguishing between association, which is a 
mere grouping by proximity, and community, which is organization by an “integra-
tive principle.” Organized publics are communities integrated by the recognition of 
their common hindrance by indirect consequences of other peoples’ actions.11 Th e 
consequences create publics from those who suff er them, but ones that are initially 
unorganized, inchoate.12 Th e problem is how to organize them.
Th e problem is a distinctly modern one. Before the industrial revolution most 
people lived in villages, which do not need conscious integrative principles because 
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they are preconsciously connected and coordinated. Ethnic groups were separated 
by mountains and seas; their activities, aside from invasions, had little impact on 
one another.13 Th ese conditions were unsettled by the industrial revolution,14 and 
only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with the spread of new technologies 
of production, transportation, and communication did the consequences of human 
action become extensive, lasting and serious on a global scale. 
World War I demonstrated that negative consequences of action were now 
world wide and existing political and legal agencies were incapable of regulating 
them. Th e new problem of the public is that serious problems are now transnational. 
Th e nation-state system does not have within it the means of healing itself and en-
gendering transnational institutions.15 Th e habitual turn to the institutional forms 
of the nation-state era among ordinary people, the “quasi-religious attachment” to 
its institutions and traditions, are now a huge obstacle to even imagining relevant 
institutional responses.16 Great obstacles prevent organizing people across state 
borders into eff ective forces for global regulation, yet these forces are increasingly 
necessary.17 Th e problem of the public is organizing publics capable of imagining 
and bringing into existence cosmopolitan governing institutions. Th is remains the 
problem facing cosmopolitan theory and practice today.  
Dewey’s Theory of Inquiry as a Meta-Theory for Cosmopolitan 
Studies
What then does Dewey’s pragmatism off er in confronting this problem? Th e fi rst 
contribution lies in the role of his theory of inquiry as a meta-theory that avoids un-
bridgeable theory-practice gaps in cosmopolitan studies. Nussbaum, Held, Singer,18 
and many other contemporary cosmopolitans have adopted a theoretical approach 
marked by universalism, formalism, and abstraction from specifi c intercultural and 
transnational imbalances and disruptions. Th ey theorize from fi rst principles, and 
at considerable remove from the actors and ameliorative agencies in the situation. 
Th e termini of their inquiries are prescriptions off ered “to those who may be con-
cerned,” as “advice” from “experts.” Nussbaum in particular bases cosmopolitan 
hope on universal reason: ameliorative action results from rational dialogue across 
diff erences. She thus addresses actors most capable of rational deliberation, within 
governing bureaucracies, nongovernmental organizations, and universities. 
It has been widely recognized that this method of cosmopolitan inquiry has 
done little to advance ameliorative practice. Th ree problems arise: Such elite actors 
have little on-the-ground experience with disrupted situations, they do not speak 
for masses of aff ected but less articulate people, and they rarely turn to philoso-
phers for advice.19 Abstract approaches to cosmopolitan theory thus have created 
an unbridgeable theory-practice divide. 
K. Anthony Appiah has off ered an alternative approach.20 Westbrook has 
labeled it pragmatist, because it is “an ethical pluralism that is not relativism and 
a fallibilism that is not skepticism.”21 But this is an insuffi  cient rendering of the 
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pragmatist dimension of Appiah’s cosmopolitanism. Westbrook does not mention 
that Appiah22 builds on the notion of the “primacy of the practical” to off er an an-
tifoundationalist cosmopolitan theory. For Appiah ideas and concepts arise out of 
the habits and customs embedded in practices that vary with diff erent groups. Th ere 
are no philosophical fi rst principles. Th ere is no universal reason. People change as 
they become more familiar with one another, not because of reasoned arguments. 
Agreements about what to do and how to do it won’t depend on agreement about 
the “why,” the rational basis for action. Th ey will arise only as they form new ways 
of doing things in responding to new conditions. Such pragmatist views may be said 
to be in the air in the Anglo-American philosophical circles Appiah travels in, and 
can be traced at fi rst instance to Wittgenstein,23  who has also has had a profound 
infl uence on recent American pragmatists such as Rorty and Shusterman. All of 
these views, furthermore, have direct parallels in Dewey’s works. 
Appiah’s intervention thus opens a large window of opportunity for further 
pragmatist insights. But beyond vague assurances that cosmopolitan exchanges 
and ameliorative eff orts are possible, and that cosmopolitan attitudes will expand 
as diff erent groups become more familiar with one another, he has had little to say 
about today’s urgent problems. Westbrook and Robbins24 have detected complacency 
in Appiah’s theorizing, as though getting the philosophical theory right were suf-
fi cient. Appiah’s brand of pragmatism fails adequately to grasp either the concrete 
problems generating cosmopolitan concern or the contribution scholarship might 
off er to their resolution. It stops half way.
By contrast, Dewey’s theory of inquiry directs immediate attention to concrete 
situations, to facts on the ground and consequences felt by those aff ected, to avail-
able venues for deliberation and ameliorative agencies and their modes of response. 
Th e work of philosophers and social researchers (ideally, working in collaboration) 
is thus made continuous with and connected to potent and more democratic forces 
for change. Th e problem of existing social inquiries, Dewey says, is that they are 
too scientifi c, meaning too abstract (as are the contemporary theorists referenced 
above), too caught up with specialized methods beyond the ken of ordinary peo-
ple.25 As a result they off er little to those already engaged and positioned to act. Th e 
result is technocracy: Science applied to humans, not by them.26  
Cosmopolitan inquiry, for Dewey, starts with the problems of cosmopolitan 
disorder as experienced—migrations, illegal immigrations, humanitarian break-
downs—and further defi nes them by establishing conditions under which aff ected 
people can be heard, relevant facts determined, questions refi ned for investigation, 
and ends tentatively projected. As Dewey puts this, “Th e thinker, like the carpenter, 
is at once stimulated and checked in every stage of his procedure by the particu-
lar situation that confronts him.”27 Just as carpenters select tools pertinent to their 
tasks and consult homeowners at every step, and don’t consider their job complete 
until the house is ready for occupation, cosmopolitan researchers would consider 
concrete concerns of those aff ected from the outset, and call upon situated actors 
to explore ideas intended for use in their ameliorative eff orts and contribute to their 
E&C ?  Education and Culture
120  ?  Leonard J. Waks
evaluation aft er they are applied so that they may be modifi ed. Inquiry, pragmati-
cally conceived, “necessarily contains a practical factor . . . leading to an activity of 
doing and making which reshapes the antecedent existential material which sets 
the problem of inquiry.”28 Both scholarship and activist practice are dimensions of 
experience, of doing and undergoing. Inquiry arises when the doings of primary 
experience meet resistance leading to hesitation of doubt, and ends when means 
it projects for restoring those doings are satisfactorily tested in action. No theory-
practice gap arises.
Dewey’s Theory of Agency through Art 
Dewey’s theory of social and political agency through art as experience is a valuable 
adjunct to his theory of inquiry, as it illuminates the continuity between profes-
sional inquiry and the organization and deliberation of publics.  
Dewey stands nearly alone among major political theorists in not equating 
political communication with speech and writing.29 Indeed, for Dewey, art not 
speech is the primary category. He writes, “People live in community in virtue of 
things they have in common and communication is the way in which they come to 
have things in common.”30 Because in communication both the speaker and listener 
must expand their imaginations to encompass the other, the attitudes of both are 
broadened. Th us “all communication is like art.”31 
In this regard, Appiah also conceives conversation as shared imaginative ex-
perience that is more important in attitude change than reasoning. He nevertheless 
concentrates narrowly on conversation, not more broadly on art, as the primary 
instrument of change.32 Nussbaum also assigns important roles to literature and 
art in cosmopolitan liberal education for world citizenship.33 But in concentrating 
her attention on “high arts” as intellectual subject matters, she again restricts the 
scope of her project to elite audiences.34
Dewey’s approach to the arts as instruments of communication, by contrast, 
focuses upon popular art objects and practices, and situates them in a comprehen-
sive project of education as community building. I briefl y consider three such uses: 
1) as fi rst indicators of social disruption, 2) as instruments for the formation of cos-
mopolitan democratic publics, and 3) as stimuli for collective deliberation among 
those from diff erent cultural backgrounds.35
Dewey notes that the fi rst dawning of thought in relation to a disrupted or 
imbalanced situation consists of a “period of occupation with relatively crude and 
unorganized facts,” a hunting for, collecting and  organizing of raw materials, of 
thinking that doesn’t yet fall under the purview of any existing methods of inqui-
ry.36 At this initial stage of inquiry the arts, including the popular arts, provide 
researchers with the earliest warning signals of disruption. Elsewhere he contin-
ues, “Th e fi rst strivings of dissatisfaction and the fi rst intimations of a better fu-
ture are always found in works of art,”37 because art is a channel for spontaneous, 
pre-rationalized initial expressions of the ‘whole person.’ For Dewey, “Artists are 
always the real purveyors of the news.”38 Even works of subjective self expression 
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are not to be dismissed; they point to blocked channels of social communication.39 
Indeed, all art is a process of making the world a diff erent place to live, and thus 
involves a phase of protest.40 Art is never merely subjective self-expression. Artists 
respond to objective conditions in situations they share with others. Th ey express 
what many feel but cannot say. 
Once disrupted situations attain a measure of attention, art next serves in 
forming nascent publics: groups aff ected by the disruption but not yet organized to 
aff ect change. Mattern labels this use the “pragmatic” function of art.41 Publics may 
crystallize spontaneously around seeds planted by popular art, but even then the 
process involves intellectual inputs. Mattern’s examples include 1960s rock music 
concerts amplifying opposition to the Vietnam War, and mural projects bringing 
poor people in local communities together to voice common problems and hopes 
they can then represent in murals. Both cases represent a rich interchange among 
engaged intellectuals, activists, and ordinary people.42  Here inquiry leads at early 
stages to the projecting of aesthetic experiences as means for the end in view of 
public formation.  
Such examples indicate the enlarged scope for social action Dewey envisions 
for the arts and his theory of experience illuminates this. Participants recruited for 
social action do not at fi rst have to be rational agents capable of deliberation; they 
need only to be capable of experience, of perceiving and responding to art works 
that represent their concerns. Art thus functions in the realm of primary experi-
ence. Conscious thought at the level of secondary experience, Dewey warns, takes 
place on a “trivial plane,” while art penetrates deeper and breaks “through the crust 
of conventionalized and routine consciousness.”43 Dewey speaks here of “meanings 
shared by means of symbols that create ties leading to the conversion of association 
into community of action saturated by mutual interest.”44 Sharing art experiences 
can bring forth emotions and stimulate deeper exchange of personal concerns and 
longings, leading to bonds of trust that open new contexts of, and capabilities for, 
deliberation and action.45
Art works can then stimulate deliberation and debate among community 
members regarding their commitments, practices, and responses to problems. 
Shared art experiences make a public more informed and intelligent by opening 
new vistas and widening perception. Dewey broadens this “deliberative” function 
of art46 especially in Th e Public and its Problems. Rejecting the conventional social 
inquiries of professional scholars as impotent and inaccessible,47 he calls for a new 
kind of artistically presented social knowledge capable of making a direct popular 
appeal by grasping the meaning of social life so deeply “as to ease its fl ow into the 
judgment of ordinary people.”48
For deliberation to be fruitful, participants must be capable of sound judg-
ment. Th is does not require expertise, or possession of great native intelligence. 
Practical intelligence is a function of general background knowledge, education 
and culture.49 In this way science bearing on concrete concerns can be imparted to 
ordinary people in clear, simple, and engaging ways and itself become a popular art 
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serving this “deliberative” function.50 Th us Dewey’s refl ections on art bear directly 
upon today’s cosmopolitan situation. Any study of the public and its problems to-
day must aim at cross cultural and transnational communication and cooperation 
through the formation of nascent publics, and must take account of the barriers 
that inhibit it. Th at is, it must be cosmopolitan. 
Th e pre-discursive nature of artistic expression provides a key to its distinctly 
cosmopolitan relevance . . . to communication across cultures. Because it works within 
the realm of primary experience, art is more universal than the discursive instruments 
of secondary experience.  Dewey states that “art is a more universal mode of language 
than is speech.”51 Because the art of any people, taken as a whole, “is expressive of a 
deep-seated attitude of adjustment.” It is “the means for entering sympathetically into 
the deepest elements in the experience of remote and foreign civilizations.”52 We can 
grasp the art of other peoples, however, only by taking the spirit of that art into our 
own attitude. In this way “barriers are dissolved, limiting prejudices melt away.”53 
When this happens a “genuine continuity is aff ected . . . our own experience does not 
thereby lose its individuality, but it takes into itself and weds elements that expand 
its signifi cance.”54   He adds, “Th is insensible melting is far more effi  cacious than the 
change eff ected by reasoning, because it enters directly into attitude.”55 Th rough art 
cosmopolitan communities can be created, bonds can be formed across diff erences 
and eventuate in fruitful deliberation and cooperative social action.
Conclusion 
While the scholarly literature on cosmopolitanism is growing exponentially, its im-
pact on ameliorative practice remains negligible. Dewey’s pragmatism off ers two 
valuable lessons in this situation. 
First, his theory of inquiry provides a heuristic for a new project of cosmo-
politan scholarship, in which scholars from multiple disciplines and other social 
actors collaborate in constructing agendas for study grounded in today’s concrete 
problems. Scholars can enrich and test their more abstract theories while assist-
ing in the improvement of social conditions. Activists can in turn become better 
informed and more judicious in their methods. 
Second, Dewey’s theory of art as experience defi nes distinct functions for the 
arts. Th ey can contribute in the early identifi cation of problematic situations, in the 
formation of publics bound by a deepened recognition of their common problems, 
and in the dissemination of knowledge for better informed and more judicious 
deliberation. Such publics can then build coalitions to break from the entrenched 
models of the nation-state era and imagine and build new, currently not even imag-
ined, cosmopolitan institutions.   
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